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Article 11

PRIVATIZATION: A CASE ANALYSIS OF SPECIAL LEGAL
ISSUES
ANTONIO FRANCK CABRERA*
I. INTRODUCTION
The past wave of privatizations has contributed to a redefinition of the role of
government worldwide and the competitive landscape of national economies. Recent
experiences provide a wealth of material to reflect upon the topic of privatizations
with deeper analysis and the benefit of hindsight.
It is widely accepted that privatizations can contribute to improve the performance and allocation of assets in an economy. According to conventional wisdom,
privatization invariably improves corporate governance, management and performance. Despite these benefits, experience demonstrates that each privatization poses
a unique set of problems and challenges.
II. BACKGROUND TO MEXICO'S PRIVATIZATION PROCESS
One of the countries that implemented an ambitious privatization program, and
continues to do so, is Mexico. Privatization was one of the key elements of economic
reform in Mexico during the past decade. It was seen as a necessary condition to
permanently correct the deficient nature of public finances and develop the
productive sector. The sale, liquidation, merger or transfer of small government
entities started in 1983. The aim was to develop expertise before moving into the
privatization of larger entities.'
Another action taken by Mexico to reduce government participation in the
economy was to permit private investment in activities formerly restricted to
government control such as railroads, and natural gas transportation and distribution.
Private investment has taken the place of government spending in many areas of the
Mexican economy. In sum, the type of industries privatized or where private
investment participation has been encouraged includes steel, telecommunications,
airports, banks, electricity, ports, highways, radio, television, water and railways,
among others. 2
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1. PEDRO ASPE ARMELLA, EL CAINno MExIcANO DE LA TRANSFORMACION ECONOMICS, FONDO DE
CULTURA ECONOM[CA (1993).
2. For further clarification refer to table one and table two.
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TABLE I
NUMBER OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES PRIVATIZED 1970-963

177
504
1,155
412
219
195

1970
1975
1982
1988
1994
1996
TOTAL VALUE OF ENTERPRISES SOLD

$942 million USD
$23.097 billion USD

1983-88
1989-94

TABLE 2
GOVERNMENT OWNED ENTERPRISES 1982-19944
Year Government
Entities
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Minority
Trusts
Majority
Ownership Ownership
744
700
703
629
528
437
252
229
147
120
100
98
107

Total
1155
1074
1049
941
737
617
412
379
280
241
217
210
219'

3. Source: Secretariade Hacienday Credito Publico and Secretarfa de Comunicaciones y Transportes.
4. Jacques Rogozinski, La Privatazaci6nen Mexico, EDITORIAL TRLLAS, (1997).

5. The increase in the number of entities is due to the creation of the "Administraciones Portuarias
Integrates" which are explained in connection with the privalization of ports.
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Mexico has also made a significant effort to attract foreign investment. As
competition from national economies for foreign investment flows increased during
the past two decades, it became increasingly evident that a new legal framework was
needed to attract foreign investment. The Foreign Investment Law of 19736,
reflected the prevailing view at the time, that foreign investment should be
scrutinized and controlled. It was basically a restrictive law, which did not encourage
the flow of foreign investment. In 1989, the Mexican government issued a set of
regulations 7 aimed at liberalizing the implementation of the Foreign Investment Law
of 1973. Subsequently, in 1993 a new law was enacted to update the legal framework
applicable to foreign investment
The 1993 Law incorporated many of the
provisions found in the 1989 Regulations and, in addition, further liberalized the
foreign investment legal regime.
To facilitate foreign investment, the 1993 Law included, among others: (i) the
elimination of the requirement for foreigners to obtain prior authorization to exceed
forty-nine percent ownership in most areas of commerce, except in those areas
specifically limited by the Mexican Constitution or special legislation; (ii) the
elimination of certain performance requirements previously imposed on foreign
owned enterprises, such as the need to maintain a positive balance of foreign
exchange, the need to make additional investments in fixed assets, or to export
products at a certain level; and (iii) the possibility of obtaining a waiver of the need
to comply with commitments or performance requirements pursuant to the 1989
Regulations when securing approval for the original investment.
The privatization process in Mexico has been tested under extreme circumstances
of the current economic crisis. Mexico, once considered one of the leading examples
of the privatization process in Latin America, has experienced the worst economic
crisis since the great depression, with a decline in its Gross National Product of 6.7%
during 1995.
The December 1994 peso devaluation, the period of high interest rates and the
economic recession that followed had significant repercussions on the Mexican
banking and financial system. In trying to avoid a banking crisis that could further
increase the contraction in the real economy and set the stage for a recovery of the
financial system, the government took a number of actions. Among them are:
amendments to the legal framework for foreign ownership of banks, reinforcement
of supervision, the managerial intervention of troubled banks, programs for recapitalizing banks, and the introduction of inflation-indexed lending and the
provision of indexed funding to banks that proved unable to weather the crisis and
its aftermath. The combination of these measures has permitted banks and the
banking and payments system as a whole to continue to operate and recover despite
a very sharp contraction in the real economy.'

6. Ley ParaPromover laInversion Mexicana y Regular la InversionExtranjera, D.O., 9 de marzo de 1973
(hereinafter 1973 Law).
7. Reglamento de la Ley para Promover laInversion Mexicana y Regular la Inversion Extranjera, D.O.,
16 de mayo de 1989 (hereinafter 1989 Regulations).
8. Ley de Inversion Extranjera,DO., 27 de diciembre de 1993 as amended by D.O., 18 de diciembre de
1996 (hereinafter 1993 Law).
9. Roy A. Karaoglan & Mike Lubrano, Mexico's Banks after the December 1994 Devaluation - A
Chronology of the Government's Response, 16 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 24 (Fall 1995).
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II. GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMY AND
PRIVATIZATION
Economic literature has documented cases in which participation of government
in the economy might be necessary and justified. The most common examples of
government participation have included situations when there are insufficient tax
revenues, when the size of the market is insufficient to maintain a competitive
structure, or when private investment is unavailable. Some of these conditions were
present in Mexico during the first decades of the century and led the government to
participate in capital intensive industries, such as steel works and railroads.
In Mexico, government participation expanded as nationalistic rhetoric grew. This
led the government to distort the purpose of government participation. The
government acquired ownership of movie theaters, hotels, airlines, and other
unrelated businesses. The result was that the government owned sectors which had
no unifying strategy, and economic resources were diverted to subsidize state owned
enterprises. Nationalistic rhetoric also prevented private investment in many areas
of the economy, resulting in the government running up a considerable external debt
to finance investment in those areas.
Another perverse effect was that negative incentives were built into the system for
private companies to respond to external shocks. After all, if they failed, the worst
case scenario was that the government would nationalize them. By rescuing failed
enterprises, the government contributed to create a culture of lack of accountability
among certain groups in the private sector.
IV. SOME LESSONS FROM THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS OF MEXICO
The former head of the privatization program in Mexico used an anecdote to
illustrate the folly of indiscriminate government participation in the economy. When
the government subsidized Aceros Monterrey, a steel company, 5,000 jobs were
saved. However, 10,000 jobs could have been created if, instead of subsidizing
Aceros Monterrey, the government had wisely invested the same amount of money
in another area of the economy, such as highway development or other infrastructure
projects. Such an investment would have doubled the number of highways in
Mexico.
Unfortunately, many mistakes like those made with Aceros have occurred.
Opportunities have been missed by funneling resources into unproductive businesses
instead of investing in education, health and basic infrastructure. One of the most
significant privatizations was the privatization of the banking system.
President Lopez Portillo nationalized the banking system during the last year of
his office and banks remained in the hands of government until the privatization of
the banking system under President Salinas in 1991 and 1992. The privatization of
the banks yielded approximately twelve billion USD, yet the privatization was laced
with problems.
It has been argued that the high premiums at which banks were privatized during
1991 and 1992 was one of the main reasons for their subsequent financial distress.
In addition, the 1994 currency crisis and the contraction in the economy hit the
relatively new banking system while it was still undergoing a process of consolida-
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tion with both the banks and the supervisory authorities working to improve their
institutional capacity.' 0
Another reason for the failure of banks rested in flaws in credit assessment.
Unaccustomed to lending to the private sector, banks were lending too much to
borrowers of doubtful quality. Traditionally, a rapid expansion of lending to private
enterprises usually takes place at the cost of a drop-off in portfolio quality, and
Mexico was no exception. After the crisis, the drop-off in asset quality and the
inability of borrowers to meet their financial obligations required banks to increase
substantially their loan reserves and provisions to cover their actual and potential loan
losses."
The end result was high prices paid for the banks contributed to their subsequent
financial distress. Banks developed dangerous mismatches between the short-term
foreign financing and escalating bad loan portfolios. Because the banking problem
created a large increase in bad debts, several government actions were implemented
to avoid the system from breaking despite a big devaluation and a major recession. 2
The government initiated, among others: increased regulation and supervision; bank
fund for savings protection ("FOBAPROA") participation; relaxation of foreign
investment restrictions; management interventions; increased provisions;
capitalization programs; and debt restructuring programs (UDI scheme).
The government intervened in several banks that failed to comply with applicable
regulations and specific recommendations from financial authorities. The motivation
of the government was to avoid greater harm to the financial system at large and
therefore implemented a temporary capitalization program to ensure banks were able
to meet their obligations with depositors. Additionally, debt restructuring programs
for small and mid-sized were specially designed to support debtors in the payment
of credit card, working-capital, loans, mortgages and car loans which represent a
significant portion of bad debts in the banking sector.
Another significant change in Mexico was the privatization of Telefonos de
Mexico ("Telmex"). The privatization of Telmex in 1991, marked the discovery of
Latin American equities for mainstream foreign investors. Before Telmex,
coordinators of the privatization had to take Mexican officials to see investors and
explain where the country was and what its reforms meant. After Telmex, investors
could not get enough Latin American stocks. As a result, American and European
money poured into Mexican equities.' Prior to the privatization of Telmex, the
government had a dual role as regulator and owner. In preparation for its sale, the
company was restructured. Modifications were made to the union agreement, and
fiscal reform was done with respect to the telephone tax, repurchase of debt, sale of
accounts receivable, and bond issuance and rate adjustments.
Mexican control of the company was a requisite objective of the privatization.
The key element in the financial scheme was the issuance of a limited voting stock,
resulting in a strategic group which would have control over the management of the
company. Later, the public auction procedure took place, and in order to participate,

10. Id. at 25.

11. Id. at 26-27.
12. Id. at 27.
13. The RollercoasterRegion, (economic instabilityin Latin America)(Latin America

Survey), THE ECONOMIST, Vol. 337, No. 7944. (December 9, 1995).
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investors needed to pre-qualify. Finally a public offering was made in the world
markets.
V. PRIVATIZATIONS DURING THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION
During the administration of President Zedillo, the privatization process of public
enterprises has continued. The failure of some banks to meet their financial
obligations and their subsequent rescue by the government to protect the public and
the stability of financial markets, have initiated a second round of bank privatizations.
Hopefully, the mistakes incurred during the first round have been assimilated, so that
such mistakes are not repeated.
It is important to highlight that the privatization taking place during this
administration has required significant modifications to the existing legal framework.
The Constitution has been amended to permit foreign investment in railroads and
satellites. Also new laws have been enacted to regulate ports, railroads, civil
aviation, airports and federal telecommunications. Modifications to the legal
framework add to the complexity of implementing a privatization process. The
following is an overview of the privatizations that are taking place during this
administration to illustrate the changes.
A.

Railroads

In February of 1995, the door opened to private participation in the government
owned monopoly over railroads. The amendment of article 28 of the Mexican
Constitution, reclassified railroad activity to permit private investment. Later, in May
of 1995, the Law Regulating Railroad Activity 14 was enacted, to provide a framework
for this activity. Finally, in November of 1995, the General Guidelines for the
Participation of Private Investment in the Railroad System were issued by the
Ministry of Communications. This legal framework, details the procedures for
segmenting the existing railroad system by region, as well as the sale mechanisms for
the public bidding for such segments. It also sets the rules for national and foreign
investment participation in the sector. It is important to mention that foreign
investment in railroads is restricted to forty-nine percent ownership.
The experience in the privatization of railroads has can be summed up in three
problems: few bidders, valuation problems and rights of way problems. The first
competitive bidding process was that of the Chihuahua-Pacific Railroad. This
process was declared void by the authorities because the bid presented was lower
than the minimum threshold required by the government. Since then, the Northwest
Railroad and the Pacific North Railroad privatizations have been successful. Pending
privatization are the Southwest Railroad and other short railroads.
B.

Ports

The privatization process of ports has been almost entirely implemented. To
complete this process, a new law providing for the creation of Mexican companies

14.

Ley ReglamentariadelServicio Ferrovfario, D.O. 12 de Mayo de 1995; implemented by Reglamento del

Servicio Ferroviario, D.O. 30 de septiembre de 1996.
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denominated "Administraciones Portuarias Integrales" ("APIs") was required.15 APIs
have title to the concessions for the use and management of ports. APIs have been
sold to the private sector through public bidding processes. Foreign investment is
permitted up to a 100% in the port sector.
Between 1995 and 1996, auctions took place regarding several port terminals and
installations specializing in cargo, in addition to three cruise-ship terminals and the
port administrations of Acapulco and Puerto Vallarta.
C.

Petrochemicals
The bidding process for the privatization of the secondary petrochemicals sector
was expected to begin in October 1995. Foreign and national companies immediately expressed an interest. However, the government yielded to internal pressures,
which affected the initial stage of the privatization process and delayed the
implementation of privatization of sixty-one plants located within ten individual
petrochemical complexes, fourteen storage terminals, and a maritime export facility
in Pajaritos, Veracruz.
To date, the petrochemical complexes of Tula, Escolm, Cosoleacaque, Camargo,
Morelos, la Cangrejera and Pajaritos have been privatized. Cosoleacaque and
Cangrejera alone accounted for seventy percent of Pemex's total production of
petrochemical.
Some of the challenges these privatizations have faced include the difficulty in
maintaining investor interest in face of union hostility to privatization, delays in the
implementation and responsibility for environmental liabilities.
D.

Airports
In preparation for the privatization of airports, modifications to the existing legal
framework have taken place with the enactment of a new law.16 Mexico has eightythree airports, of which, only seven are profit making entities. Concessions over
airports will be granted thorough public bidding processes. It is expected that the
first bids for concessions of groups of airport terminals will take place late 1997 or
early 1998. Details of these privatizations have yet to be defined.
E.

Satellites
The amendment of article 28 of the Mexican Constitution reclassified satellite
communications to permit private investment. In February of 1995, privatization of
the government owned monopoly began. Mexico has three satellites and twelve
orbital positions. This system is used for private and commercial purposes mainly.
Privatization of this system is underway, beginning with the adoption of a new legal
framework to permit private investment in this area. A corporation denominated
Satelites Mexicanos, S.A. de C.V. has been created for the privatization of the
system, and is expected to be sold in a public bidding process before December 1997.

15. See generally, Ley de Navegacin, D.O., 4 de enero de 1994.
16. Ley de Aeropuertos, D.O. 22 de diciembre de 1995.
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F.

Other privatizations
This process of encouraging participation of private investment has not always
resulted in positive economic results for the government. One example is the
highways, which have required subsidies that amounted in 1995 to approximately 1%
of GDP, and to almost 3% of GDP during 1996. The government announced on
August 22, 1997 a US$7 billion dollar bail out to developers of highways. 7 Among
the causes that led to this economic situation were: (i) the ambition of the past
administration to build as many kilometers of highways, as those that had been
constructed in the last twenty-five years - thus fifty-two concessions were granted;
(ii) demand was inaccurately estimated; and (iii) interest rates soared after the 1994
crisis.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPSALS FOR REFORM
Although the economic reforms of the past decade have changed Mexico
profoundly, the country's economy still remains highly fragile and vulnerable to
external shocks, as the 1994 currency crisis demonstrated. The following are
proposals offered to assist in improving the stability and effectiveness of the Mexican
economy.
i.) It is important to get the macroeconomic environment right before launching
any major privatization sales. Mexico did this adequately during the first round of
privatizations. In the present administration, stabilization of the economy has been
essential to improving the conditions for privatizations. It is difficult to complete a
privatization program successfully in a context of debt overhang and macroeconomic
fragility.
ii.) Improve data on the basis of which perceptions of country risk are made.
Recent developments in the Mexican economy have significantly improved the
perception of the economic prospects for Mexico.
iii.) Provide "certainty" about the regulatory situation. This includes obtaining
certainty about the nature and quality of the regulator, the duration of the concession,
and the conditions that the privatized entity will need to fulfill as well as service
levels and quality for infrastructure investments. For example, Mexico permitted
Telmex to maintain its monopoly license for a period totaling no more than seven
years after its sell off.
iv.) Improve economic forecasting in the development of the Mexican economy,
thereby watching carefully international price benchmarking.
v) Make room for a strategic operator. In the case of Telmex, two categories of
shares were created to enable control with a small block of shares.
vi) Eliminate cross subsidies, by providing interim subsidies if necessary. In
addition, charge real prices for services.
vii) Do not link privatization to any complex, ill-defined social objectives such as
"cleaning up the environment" or "protecting employment." These programs usually
serve as excuses to lower the price.
viii) Screen potential bidders thoroughly before opening bids. Then always choose
the highest bid. It is critical that this be a sequential process.
17. Geri Smith, Mexico's Congress Turns From Lamb Into Lion, Bus. WK. 58 (September 22, 1997).
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ix) Allow time and flexibility to correct inappropriate cost structures. Telmex had
an excess of 7,000 operators when privatized.
x) Improve identification of those cases with less strategic importance.
xi) Sell "as is" whenever possible. Trying to restructure is a waste of time and
money.
xii.)Use the capital markets of developed economies for large transactions.
xiii.) Ensure participation of the Federal Antitrust Commission ("CFC"). It has
considerable power in Mexico and is a key player in most privatizations. The CFC
may be used effectively to regulate monopolies in order to encourage competition.
It is necessary for bidders to obtain the CFC's approval prior to a privatization.
Finally, as mentioned before, perhaps the most important lesson is that
privatizations are situation specific. That is, each privatization poses a unique set of
problems and challenges.

